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(p. 7). By 'spiritual self' Roland means "an inner spiritual reality ...
usually expressed in India through a complex structure of gods and
goddesses as well as through ritual and meditation and is deeply
engraved in the preconscious of all Indians ... " (p. 9). But in Japan,
Roland feels that "the avenues toward realization of the spiritual self are
different, tending toward a more aesthetic mode such as the tea
ceremony, flower arranging ... and communion with nature" (p. 9).
It is the individualized self which Roland views as "the predominant
inner psychological organization of Americans" (p. 8). The individual
self seems to be the mischievous source of the identity problem in Asians
because it functions as the destabilizing, seductive and even villainous
force that ultimately undermines the collective harmony and equilibrium
of the familial self, compelling many an Indian and Japanese person to
seek psychoanalytic help. The characteristics of the individualized self
that are most damaging to the Asian immigrant are I-ness, narcissistic
structures of self~regard, and ego-ideal saturated with competitive
individualism and self-actualization and "modes of cognition and
ego-functioning that are strongly oriented towards rationalism,
self-reflection, efficiency, mobility and adaptability to extra-familial
relationships" (pp. 7-8). Here, then, in the struggle between the security
of the human family, the fulfillment ofthe human spirit on the one hand,
and the irresistible appeal of individual freedom on the other, lies the
source for the pain and suffering of many Asians trapped rather than
liberated by the acculturation process.
David Kopf
A CIVILlLATlONAL GENERAL PEACE?

Matthew Melko, Peace In (Jur Time. NY: Paragon House, 1990.
Matthew Melko predicts peace in our time (at least in Europe) on the
basis of the rhythms of modern European history, which beg'ln in 1485
with some 1~ decades of relative peace, followed by the 30 Years' War.
Then some 14 decades of peace, f()llowed by three decades of the World
Wars. Now some fuur decades of peace solar. According to this pattern,
some 60-100 more years of peace might be expected in the Western
World, including North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Maybe
Russia and t he Far East. Melko calls the peaceful decades "normal
periods" and t he decades of war "(Tisis periods." His prediction assumes
that the patterns of the past will be repeated in the future (p. 169).
Melko establishes the rhythms of modern European history (since
1740) primarily on the basis of Bouthoul & Carrere's fatality estimates.
which the author was converted into fatalities per year and anllual
fatalities per 100,000 population (p. 56). Both measures show many more
fatalities in crisis per'iods than in normal periods, leaving no douht ahout
the difference between these two kinds of historical period.
Why the current remission of violence in the West? Melko wonders. He
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considers nuclear deterrence, but dismisses it: "The bomb does not
preserve the peace; the peace deters the use of the bomb" (p. 38). But,
what caused the peace? "It had simply become evident that the peace of
Europe was a product of political rather than military factors" (p. 75),
and" All in all there are some good reasons for anticipating a continuity
in political structure for the remainder of our time" (p. 89).
Melko spells out in some detail the characteristics of "our time"
(remembering that "our time" is actually a space-time limited to postwar
Europe et al), which presumably make some contribution toward peace
in "our time." The relational outlook is emphasized, which looks at
everything in relation to everything else, and especially in the context of a
larger system. There has been a vast revolution in transportation and
communication, and population explosion. Organizational committees
have superseded individual entrepreneurs. Social institutions tend to be
conservative. Charismatic leaders are out, and "the profit motive seems
certain to playa subordinate role" (p. 152). We are getting older, and the
baby boom will make more of us older soon. We are cornlpt as usual, but
no more immoral than usual. We are relatively free in Melko's sense of
"an awareness of the possibilities of one's own situation" (p. 159). But
many vallie equality more than freedom. In any event, the more freedom
we have, the less freedom we have, in the sense that free choices limit
further choices: "Freedom, therefore, is limited by t he exercise of
freedom" (p. 160). In which case, the best way to be free is not to exercise
freedom. In any event, "in the freest of all situations, you have no
political choice" (p. 161). Originality is a handicap and is in no great
demand. All of these characteristics add up to making "our time" a very
"normal" time indeed, which is what makes it relatively peaceful. A
"normal time" seems to be a time when enough people are so satisfied
with the status quo, that there is no crisis to impel anyone to go to war.
Problems remain, to be sure: "the nuclear dilemma and the energy
crisis ... inequality and the waning pmspects for world development ...
the possihility that peace itself can he a cause of war" (p. 166), and the
possibility that the West may really be declining, as some have predicted
since the end of the first world war, in which case there may he nothing
that we can do about any of these other problems.
Since larger systems of the past have always been brought into being by
conquest, the possibility of a world government peacefully achieved is
lInlikelv. So, where do we look liH our salvation'
Alth~ugh Melko sees small chance of a nuclear war in the shOl,t run
("mushroom clouds are simply not on the horizon," p. 172), he is
concerned that a small chance in the short run can become a larger
chance in the long run: "if there is even an average of 1'X chance of
nuclear war in a given year, over a 64-year period there would be almost
an even chance of a nuclear war" (p. 174). I think that the author has
slipped on a statistical fallacy at this point (and, of course , he thinks that 1
have done the same). As I understand prohahility theory, if there is a I (lr
chance of nuclear war in a given year, and if this chance is significantly
diffel'ent from zero, then we could have 3.65 days of nuclear war in any
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given year and, in 64 years, we could have 0.64 years of nuclear war. The
amount of time would increase, but the proportion of time would remain
constant. However, since we don't have a clue as to the overall chance of a
nuclear war, both of us have slipped on a fallacy of misplaced statistics. So
far as probabilities are based on the relative frequency of past events (or
logical inferences based on the number of sides on a coin, the number of
sides on a die, or the number of car'ds in a deck, none of which seem to
apply to wars, nuclear or otherwise), the most we can say about nuclear
wars would have to be based on the fact that the USA dropped two atom
bombs (10-20 thoumnd tons of TNT) on two Japanese cities, toward the
end of the world's biggest and deadliest war ever, 45 years ago when they
first became available. The chances are that the USA (or a nation like it)
might drop two such atom bombs under similar conditions once every 45
years except, of course, that the condition of their first becoming
available cannot be replicated. Next year the chances will drop to one in
every 46 years, if the same conditions ever prevail, which they cannot. We
can say nothing about any other country, because we have no experience
of any other country dropping such bombs under any conditions except
for testing purposes.
When it comes to hydrogen bombs (10-20 million tons of TNT, or
more, which is a kettle of fish of a much higher magnitude), we have no
experience of any country at all dropping such bombs under any
conditions except for testing purposes. Consequently, we can make no
statistical inference concerning the chances oftheir' doing so in the future
since we have no information concerning their doing so in the past. Or,
we can infer that, since no hydrogen bomb has been dropped in almost 40
years, the chance of any being dropped is Zero---!iofar. That's like the
man who fell off the top of the Empire State Building: When he reached
the forty-fourth floor, he said, "So far, so good!" That's all we can infer
on the basis of past experience. After one has been dropped, then we can
change our predictions, if anyone is left to make the necessary
calculations.
We can have our subjective feelings, of course. During the Cuban
missile crisis, I felt that the chances of a nuclear war were very high
indeed, but my feelings had nothing to do with statistical probability
estimates. They were based on my fears, and not on any relatively
frequencies of such events in the past, nor on any logical necessities
imposed upon the world by the rigid structure of a coin, a die, or a deck of
cards.
In any event, if war and peace are determined by the normality or
crises of space-times, what can governments do in our space-time? They
can save some money by reducing military expenditures, but keep their
formulas in a safe place for the next crisis period, which is bound to come
according to this theory: "This normal period in which we live will not last
forever" (p. 27), but it should continue "at least until the middle of the
twenty-first century" (p. 207), at which time "It is difficult ... to conceive
of any social action that can resolve the nuclear dilemma in the next crisis
period" (p. 209). This is a sad scenario indeed. Melko is optimistic in the
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short run, but quite pessimistic in the long run. Peace now, but the fire
next time.
If there is little or nothing that govern ments can do, except to adjust to
the rhythms of modern European history, what is the role of the activists?
First and foremost, they should remember that they are in the minority
and, therefore, they count for little in normal times, which satisfy the
overwhelming majority of us all too well. They should join the
mainstream aI1d enter' the political process.
However, if Melko's theory is wrong, "it doesn't make much
difference. Nuclear war would come, and most people would be killed,
whether or not they had prepared for it" (p. 2(8). This is a theory that is
hard to beat. You cannot lose whether it is right or wrong. If it is right,
nuclear war comes later; if it is wrong, nuclear war comes sooner. Sooner
or later, the theory predicts, there will be a nuclear war. How can you lose
with such a theory? or, rather, how can you win?
Finally, what becomes of peace researchers like the author himself,
who has pioneered the emphasis on "peace" in peace research? What can
be learned and taught except the rhythms of modern European history?
And what would be the use oflearning and teaching them, since whether
they exist or not makes little difference either way? Nuclear war is
predicted whether these past rhythms continue in the future or not.
What's to learn or teach, except how to prepare for the apocalypse now or
later? And what do peace researchers know about that? They might as
well go fishing.
This book is loaded with sociological insights that are presented in a
most delightful style. The emphasis on peace and its normality is a
welcome emphasis in a field where war usually attracts our attention. The
author deserves many thanks for this emphasis in this and other books as
well, on which he has been working for almost 25 years: 52 Peaceful
Societies (1973, but the search fix these societies began in 1966), Peace in
the Ancient World (1981, coauthored by Richanl D. Weigel), and Peace in
thl' Western World (1984, coauthored by John I lord).
William Eckhardt
MYTHOLOGIES CIVIUZATION DESTROYS

Antonio M. Stevens-Arroyo, Cm'e oj the Jaqua: The Mythological World oj
The Tainos. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988.
Antonio M. Stevens-Arroyo has presented a fascinating account of the
beliefs of the Tainos Indians of the Caribbean islands, the first
non-European peoples to discover Columbus nearly 500 years ago. They
were first enslaved and eventually extinguished by their discoveries. This
book concerns itself with those beliefs that prevailed from about 200 AD
to 1500 AD.
According to Stevens-Arroyo, '[aino mythology reflected their stage
of development, which had gone beyond gathering and hunting, but had
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